From Détente to EntenteV.P. Dutt CHINA AND PAKISTAN: DIPLOMACY OF AN ENTENTE CORDIALE By Anwar Hussain Syed Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1974, 259, 60.00 VOLUME I NUMBER 1 January - March 1976 In 1963 Maulana Bhashani met Mao in Peking and Mao spoke to
him about Pakistan, USA,
USSR, and China. China's relationship with Pakistan was extremely fragile at
the time, Mao said to Bhashani, and the United States, Russia and India would
do their utmost to break this relationship. Mao said: ‘You are our friend and
if at the present moment you continue your struggle against the Ayub
Government, it will only strengthen the hand of Russia, America and India. It
is against our principles to interfere with your work, but we would advise you
to proceed slowly and carefully. Give us a chance to deepen our friendship with
your Government.’
The Maulana agreed and kept his word for almost six
years, says Syed in this study of the development of ·Sino-Pakistan
relationship. During this time the relationship between China and Pakistan
developed and deepened and turned from detente to entente. As Syed says, the
Chinese leaders said or did nothing to support the popular movement against
Ayub Khan during 1968-69 or again the conservative and feudal rulers of
Pakistan. Indeed, it is Syed's thesis that China scrupulously kept out of
Pakistan’s internal affairs and never made any effort to encourage any revolutionary or
dissident activity.
Anwar Hussain Syed writes from
Pakistan's point of view and is often contemptuous of Indian writings on
relations with or developments in Pakistan, but if one overlooks the
pro-Islamabad trappings from his book, one will not find his thesis sharply
different from that of Indian students of Chinese developments.
Syed, who lives abroad (in Canada or
USA), had the advantage of long and significant discussions with Pakistani
leaders and diplomats and has also used a good many available English language
materials. He traces the development of Sino-Pakistan relations from 1949
onwards. He notes the early decision of the Pakistani leaders to join the US
military alliance, the consequent abrasiveness in relations with Peking and
Peking's occassional criticism of Pakistani policies. However, he notices that
the thrust of Chinese criticism was generally directed against the United
States but that China exercised moderation in its criticism of Pakistan itself,
and he largely accepts the ‘Indian view-point’ that Peking had at a very early
stage grasped the potentialities of a situation of Indo-Pak conflicts. He,
however, gives it a slightly larger canvas and believes that Peking's opening
towards Pakistan was directed equally against the United States ... Table of Contents >> |