--R.R. Subramanian ARMS, ALLIANCES AND STABILITY By Partha Chatterjee Macmillan, New Delhi, 1975, 292, 60.00 VOLUME II NUMBER 4 July-August 1977 This is a study that attempts to deal with too many topics.
Although there is much to the argument that an understanding of the current
international system presupposes a knowledge of history, Chatterjee has put
together an incoherent mixture of ideas.
To begin with, Chatterjee has started with a
historical perspective on the ‘balance of power’ notion. His first chapter
itself has quotations from various historians and then he goes on to the
theories of structural equilibrium. He says, ‘given the assumption that stability
in terms of the relative power positions of the nations is the goal of the
international system, equilibrium and balance of power become synonymous’. This
is a standard Morgenthauan mode of thought and if this and other biographical
compilations were the objective of the author there would be no argument.
Chatterjee has however attempted to bring in a
systemic type of model in his analysis of the contemporary international
system. His contention is that equilibrium may be defined in terms of a set of
arbitrarily chosen variables whose values stay within arbitrary limits for a
certain length of time when subjected to disturbing forces. Then by this conception
of equilibrium the international system is ‘ultrastable’. This is his analysis
of the ‘classical international system’. It is also discussed from an
ideological perspective a fa Marx and capitalistic mode of thought; the
arguments, however, fail to bring out an intimate connection between ideology
and the equilibrium of the international system.
In the second chapter of the book the theory of
systemic change in international politics is discussed. The system is
defined, as also its possible stability in terms of the actors constituting
it. It appears that a game theoretic approach would have delineated some of
the aspects more clearly. 'Capability' as a factor in a nation's foreign policy
objectives is introduced. Although the author has resorted to the definitions
of Modelski and Puchala, no definite criterion emerges. For instance, he goes
on to say that ‘actors make subjective estimates of capabilities.’ This is untenable
in all cases, for, in determining one's military capabilities one has a rather
quantitative mechanism available to determine one's abilities to wage war.
There is an interesting discussion on ‘rational
behaviour’ in international decision making. The author attempts to introduce
the rational choice model as an abstract ... Table of Contents >> |