logo
  New Login   
image

Strategic Assertions


Stephen P. Cohen

INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL: SEEKING SYNERGY IN BILATERALISM
By P.R. Chari
Routledge, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 326, Rs. 695.00

VOLUME XXXIV NUMBER 2 February 2010

Most contemporary great and major powers, unless protected by alliances, possess nuclear weapons, although as North Korea and Pakistan prove, having a nuclear weapon does not make you a great power—they just make you a tough problem. Nuclear weapons are very costly and require a large industrial infrastructure for their fabrication. Nuclear weapons transform military doctrine. They make obsolete such conventional strategies as massed armour attacks, and their possession compels some understanding of the arcane theorizing that has accompanied their development and deployment over sixty years. These devices also complicate command and control because they are one-off systems, seemingly not in use for long periods of time, and they have unprecedented destructive power. Becoming a nuclear weapons state in May, 1998 was one of India’s most surprising acts of strategic assertion, all the more so because it had long been identified with the view that nuclear weapons had to be abolished and were not legitimate weapons of war. In a sense, this act was even more surprising than India’s vivisection of Pakistan in 1971. Ironically, the threat that precipitated the tests was more subtle than the actual Chinese nuclear programme or a suspected Pakistani one. It was the possibility that India’s nuclear option strategy (a hypocritical term if there ever was one, because the weapons had been fabricated if not deployed) might be closed off as the international community pushed for an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India decided to break out. It tested several devices, and declared itself a nuclear weapons state. The tests and the declaration transformed India’s relations with the rest of the world, especially its strategic rivals, Pakistan and China, and above all, with the United States. Washington and New Delhi had been at odds over India’s nuclear policy from the presidency of Jimmy Carter onward. This was despite the fact that the United States had sold India a power reactor (Tarapur) in the 1960s, and earlier American officials had considered the option of encouraging India to build its own nuclear weapons in response to China’s 1964 test at Lop Nor. After an initial period of enthusiasm, relations between the two states were dominated by the nuclear issue. The 1998 tests became one of the pillars of India’s rise to great power status. The Clinton administration that had so strongly opposed India’s tests, reached a tenuous accommodation via ...


Table of Contents >>
Please or to Read Entire Article
«BACK

Free Access Online 12 Back Issues
with 1 year's subscription
Archive (1976-2011)
under construction.